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We process information in a large number of Canadian wage contracts, signed
over a period of several decades, to generate the long-run history of the
real wage for each bargaining pair. We term these hitherto unexamined
histories ‘chronologies’. We are able to generate 1574 continuous real wage
chronologies and we examine the evolution of the real wage in each case.
We explore the inﬂuence of productivity growth, the labour relations record
of the pair, the inﬂuence of industry and region as well as the initial wage
on the growth of the real wage rate over the decades in the sample. We
also consider the relation between the mean and variance of the real wage
contained in these chronologies.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E31, J41, J50
Keywords: Wages, productivity, labour relations, compensating diﬀer-
entials, convergence.1 Introduction
The short-run wage determination process is one of the best-studied areas of
economics. The various generations of Phillips Curves and the more recent
l i t e r a t u r eo nW a g eC u r v e sa r ee ﬀorts in this direction that have produced
a wealth of information for a large number of countries. Related to these
literatures are eﬀorts which document phenomena that are, at ﬁrst blush,
inconsistent with a narrow interpretation of classical theory and have led to
eﬀorts to understand them from new theoretical vantage points. These eﬀorts
include papers which deal with industry wage diﬀerentials for apparently
‘identical’ workers; these diﬀerentials have remained remarkably stable over
time and have been documented for a number of countries. Regional eﬀects
are also remarkably stable, though these are more obviously consistent with
classical notions.1
Far less attention has been paid to long-run wage determination processes.
Few papers attempt to map and analyse the growth of real wages in particu-
lar contexts over several decades.2 The most likely explanation is the scarcity
of appropriate data. National data on real wages are, of course, available.
But important puzzles (other than whether real wages across nations con-
verge), such as the existence and persistence of interindustry and regional
wage diﬀerentials, are intra-national issues. Many panel data which do pro-
1An u m b e ro fo t h e re ﬀects involving ﬁrm size, marital status, and gender are also
well-established and have also led to fertile discussions and new insights.
2An interesting development has been the ﬂowering of the empirical literature on na-
tional economic growth and its examination of the important notion of convergence in
income per capita across nations. Presumably, income convergence at the national level is
asociated with real wage convergence as well, particularly within nations and their regions.
1vide information at the micro level involve the rotation of individual respon-
dents, thus limiting the period over which their real wages can be studied. In
addition, individual mobility across jobs, professions and regions poses other
challenges.
Information that relates to the wages paid by ﬁrms/institutions to par-
ticular classes of workers over long periods of time avoids the data prob-
lems with individuals just noted. For instance, the base wage paid to en-
try level workers relates to certain job requirements and abstracts from the
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c so ft h ew o r k e r st h e m s e l v e s( e . g . t h e i ri d e n t i t y ,g e n d e r ,a n d
marital status). Naturally, institutional survival along with the secular sta-
bility of job requirements are important issues that must be kept in mind,
as is the generality of results that might be claimed from data on particular
ﬁrms/institutions.
A source of information along these lines derives from the collective bar-
gaining agreements reached between a ﬁrm/institution and the union repre-
senting a particular group of employees. Data available between 1976 and
2000 on the bargains reached in the Canadian unionised sector make it pos-
sible to observe, through this very long period, the history of the real wage
agreed upon by each bargaining pair in the sample. We term these real wage
histories ‘chronologies’. These chronologies, which have never been exam-
ined, provide a unique insight into the history of the real wage level agreed
to by a large number of bargaining pairs.3
3The studies of Hamermesh (1970) and Sparks and Wilton (1971) pioneered the econo-
metric exploration of US and Canadian collective bargaining agreements (respectively).
With time, these explorations became broader and began to cover other provisions of
wage contracts such as (i) the incidence and intensity of wage indexation issues, in inter
2We map the proﬁle of these real wage chronologies over several decades
and thousands of wage contracts and ask a number of questions. What do
these wage proﬁles look like? Do these chronologies reﬂect the interindus-
try and regional wage patterns that have been noted in earlier literatures?
Conditioning on industry and regional eﬀects, is there any evidence of con-
vergence through time in these wage rates? Do these chronologies reﬂect
the secular productivity growth of the sector from which they derive? Does
recent attention to the labour relations environment4 within which the wage
agreements were reached seem warranted? Can any relationship between
alia Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1983, 1984), Card (1983, 1986), and Hendricks and
Kahn (1983) and (ii) the duration of wage contracts, in inter alia Murphy (1992, 2000).
These are but a few examples of papers that deal with the major provisions of contracts,
some addressing several features at the same time and others venturing into further points
of interest - e.g. Hendricks and Kahn (1986), Fortin (1996), Gu and Kuhn (1998), and
Danziger and Neuman (2005).
These studies have not exploited the entire history of the collective bargaining agree-
ments reached by a pair (a ﬁrm and a particular union). The concepts of unexpected and
uncompensated inﬂation require that contracts be connected so that information from the
previous contract can be allowed to inﬂuence the terms of the current agreement - see
Christoﬁdes (1987). However, these connections are between consecutive contracts only.
Also, the examination of a possible wage ‘explosion’ in the aftermath of wage controls
relied on linking contracts under controls with those signed by the same pair in the after-
math of controls - see Christoﬁdes and Wilton (1985). Finally, the papers on holdout pay
attention to the issue of timing between contracts. However, the entire contractual history
for each pair can be linked together and the length of these chronologies is limited only
by the available sample length and by possible breaks in the relationship between pairs.
4See Blanchard and Philippon (2004), Park (2007), Aghion, Algan and Cahuc (2008)
and references therein.
3moments of the real wage chronologies, which might suggest that high real
wage variability must be compensated for, be discerned? We deal with these
questions, taking into account the possible endogeneity of the initial wage
needed to examine convergence through a uniquely appropriate instrument.
Real wages are surprisingly ﬂat over the entire period studied. We ﬁnd
industry and regional patterns in the chronologies that conform with those
apparent in short run wage determination studies. Also at odds with narrow
classical notions is the apparent dependence of real wages on productivity
growth in the sector (as distinct from economy wide growth) and the in-
dustrial relations record of the pair. On the other hand, conditioning on
industry, regional eﬀects and other variables, the evidence for convergence is
strong, suggesting that important arbitrage processes are at play in the long
run. Looking within these real wage chronologies, it appears that chronolo-
gies involving a high average value also tend to have a high variance of the
real wage rate. We note that chronologies could also be used to analyse other
labour market outcomes (e.g. indexation incidence and strength, as well as
contract duration) but such tasks are beyond the scope of the current paper.
In section 2, the data used and the concept of a real wage chronology,
as it derives from the contract data, are discussed; features of the derived
chronologies are also examined. In section 3, the method used to examine
these chronologies econometrically is presented and the results obtained are
discussed in section 4. Conclusions appear in section 5.
42 Contract Data and the Wage Chronologies
The contract data used for this study are constructed from electronic records
provided by Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC), as it was
known when the data were released to us. The data base contains infor-
mation on 11885 contracts signed between 1976 and 2000 by ﬁrms which
employ 500 or more employees. Each contract contains a unique identiﬁer
which allows us to string together all agreements signed by the same pair. In
order to ensure the continuity needed in the chronologies, only contracts with
an uninterrupted history are included in the analysis, leaving 8928 contracts
available for analysis - construction contracts are also excluded because they
were not part of the data until 1984. The HRDC data contain informa-
tion on a number of variables, including the settlement, eﬀective and expiry
dates of the contract, the number of employees that it covers, the indus-
try and region that it is located in, and the nominal base wage (including
‘fold-ins’ generated by the cost of living allowance clause (COLA) if any)
at the end of the previous contract pexpwage. Information in the current
contract makes it possible to generate the annual nominal wage percentage
change (including COLA generated increases)
·
w and the duration of the
contract measured as the diﬀerence between the expiry date and the eﬀec-
tive date of the current contract, Duration, in months. The nominal wage
level at the expiry date of the current contract may then be calculated as
expwage = pexpwage +( pexpwage × (
·
w/100) × (Duration/12))).
The nominal wage rates pexpwage and expwage are converted into real
t e r m su s i n gt h ev a l u e so ft h ec o n s u m e rp r i c ei n d e xa tt h ee x p i r yd a t eo f
the previous contract (in most cases this is equal to the eﬀective date of the
5current contract) and the expiry date of the current contract. Thus, the real
wage level at the beginning and at the end of each contract are calculated
in this way. Descriptive statistics on the variables used, by contract, are
presented in Table 1. Duration is shown to have a mean of 25.41 months
and a standard deviation of 11.62 months. The average nominal wage at the
end of previous contracts is $12.66 with a standard deviation of $4.55; at the
end of contracts, the average nominal wage is slightly higher at $13.69 with
a standard deviation of $4.57. The average real wage at the expiry date of
previous and current contracts is 15.13 and 15.24 respectively with standard
deviations of 3.99 and 4.00 respectively. The average annual increase in the
overall (including COLA) nominal wage rate is 4.85% with a standard devi-
ation of 4.26. Figure 1 shows the real hourly contract wage calculated over
all contracts whose eﬀective date falls in a particular year. For comparison
purposes, Figure 1 also shows real hourly earnings5 from 1983 to 2000 - the
period over which the latter series is available. The contract real wage series
is higher and more volatile, especially during the 1990s - we return later to
the issue of whether volatility needs to be compensated for. The relative
position of the two series is not surprising given that contract wages come
from large ﬁrms in the unionized sector. The greater volatility of the con-
tract series reﬂects the turbulent period of industrial relations in the public
(provincial and federal) sector during the period 1991 -1996, a period during
which active wage control policies were pursued. In addition, the contract
series is more likely to reﬂect idiosyncratic forces which average out in the
5Hourly earnings are the CANSIM montly series V255025. They have been converted
into real terms using the CPI index (P100000) and have been averaged by year.
6aggregate. Both series in Figure 1 show the remarkable stability in the un-
conditional real wage through time. In general, there has been no perceptible
real wage growth over this period and, indeed, both series are below their
starting values by the end of the period. One issue that is explored below
is whether productivity gains have inﬂuenced wage growth at the pair level
during this period.
The HRDC data base includes a regional identiﬁcation code and 3-digit
SIC code which allow us to create seven regional dummy variables (At-
lantic, Quebec, Ontario, Prairie, British Columbia, Territories and Multi-
province6) and ten industrial dummy variables (Natural Resources, Manufac-
turing, Transportation, Communication, Utilities, Trade, Education, Health,
Services and Others) that categorize each contract. Table 1 shows that most
contracts are in Education (27%), followed by Manufacturing (20%), and in
Ontario (35%). Figures 2 and 3 show the hourly real contract wage calculated
over all contracts, whose eﬀective date falls in a particular year, by SIC (Fig-
u r e2 )a n db yr e g i o n( F i g u r e3 ) .A si nt h ec a s eo fF i g u r e1 ,as t r i k i n gf e a t u r e
of Figures 2 and 3 is the remarkable ﬂatness of the series for each industry
and region. However, more features of interest are apparent at the indus-
try and regional levels. In Figure 2, remarkably stable inter-industry wage
diﬀerentials are apparent over this two-decade period. Services generally
have the lowest real wage while contracts in Education, Natural Resources,
Transportation and Manufacturing tend to have the highest real wages. This
ranking is consistent with the one in data from the 1986 Labour Market Ac-
tivity Survey of Canada established by Gera and Grenier (1994).7 Figure 3
6Certain contracts cover more than one province and are thus multi-regional.
7There is a widespread view that industry eﬀects, which are signiﬁcant in individual
7shows similar information to that in Figure 2 but on a regional basis. Con-
tracts in the Atlantic provinces have the lowest real wages during most of
this period while contracts in British Columbia and Ontario have the highest
real wages - note that a common price index has been used to deﬂate across
regions. Again, this ranking is consistent with stylized facts about regional
disparities in Canada over the period studied. In the empirical work below
we take into account possible industry and region eﬀects. There is slight
visual evidence of some convergence in the series of Figure 3, a general issue
t ow h i c hw er e t u r nb e l o w .
One contribution of this paper is arranging the contract data into pair-
based chronologies. This is achieved by sorting the contracts using the unique
identiﬁer for each pair. Overall, 1574 unique chronologies can be created.
The longest chronology involves as many as 19 renewals and spans a hori-
zon of 24 years. As an example, Figure 4 presents the 17 longest real wage
chronologies in Manufacturing. Each line shows the real wage history em-
bodied in the contracts signed by a particular pair. For instance, the top
wage functions, cannot be easily explained by classical competitive theories of wage de-
termination (see Slichter (1950), Thurow (1976), Wachtel and Betsey (1972) and Cain
(1976)). Studies of wage determination based on human capital and mobility frictions
typically leave substantial unexplained inter-industry or inter-ﬁrm wage diﬀerentials - see
Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers (1988). Helwege (1992) shows that
those diﬀerentials are not highly positively correlated with subsequent employment growth,
as one could expect if they resulted from mobility frictions. Gibbons and Katz (1992) in-
vestigate the possibility that diﬀerentials are explained by unmeasured ability diﬀerences
but do not have encouraging results. The more recent study by Walsh (1999) shows that
the eﬃciency wage model can only explain a small fraction of the wage diﬀerentials that
prevail accross industries.
8line joining the circles shows that this particular pair agreed to the highest
sequence of real wages among all the chronologies shown. The ﬁrst dot shows
the beginning-of-contract (i.e. pexpwage) real wage for a one-year agreement
that became eﬀective in 1979 and the next dot its end-of-contract real wage
(i.e. expwage); the latter is higher than the former, indicating that there
was real wage growth during this contract. The end-of-contract real wage
is also the (prior to the) beginning-of-contract wage for the next agreement
which became eﬀective in 1980 and lasted until 1983. This second contract
entailed a reduction in the real wage rate. This may have occurred despite
increases in the nominal wage rate if, as was likely, inﬂation was unexpectedly
strong during this period. The third contract in the sequence began in 1983;
it was a two-year contract, and did entail real wage growth. The particular
chronology discussed shows the changing pattern of contract duration for the
pair involved and follows a slight upward trajectory. This is generally true
of the other chronologies shown in Figure 4. There is considerable diﬀer-
ence in the real wages paid by the top and bottom chronologies; in the case
of Figure 4, this diﬀerence is more than ten real dollars per hour. This is
noteworthy given that, in both cases, the real wage shown is the base wage
for ﬁrms in manufacturing, albeit not necessarily ﬁrms of the same size and
not necessarily paid to workers with similar skills who are represented by the
same unions. It should be noted that a smaller diﬀerence remains even if we
conﬁne Figure 4 to Ontario, thereby reducing (but not eliminating) regional
disparities.
A ﬁnal feature of Figure 4 is that not all chronologies begin or end at
the same time. For some purposes, it is useful to have common starting
9and ending points for these chronologies. For instance, any discussion of
the inﬂuence of the initial wage and convergence would be facilitated if this
condition were satisﬁed. With this in mind, we selected a ﬁxed window of 22
years, from 1980 to 2001, and discarded the modest amount of information
outside this window. When a chronology is incomplete, either at the start
o ra tt h ee n do ft h ew i n d o w ,w eu s ei n f o r m a t i o ni nt h ee x t a n tc h r o n o l o g y
to complete it. More precisely, we calculate the average annual growth rate
‘Grate’ Gratei =(ln wTi − ln w0i) /To v e rt h ee n t i r ee x t a n tc h r o n o l o g y
of length T and use this to compute the starting (1980) level of the real
wage; wTi indicates the expiry wage expwage a tt h ee n do ft h el a s tc o n t r a c t
and w0i the initial wage pexpwage at the beginning of the ﬁrst contract in
the chronology. The resulting information is used in Figure 5 to illustrate
how the values of Grate in the 387 chronologies in Manufacturing relate to
the logarithm of the initial wage in the respective chronology. A negative
relationship, statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, is suggested - ﬁgures
in brackets are t-statistics. We return to this issue in the empirical section
below.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on important variables based on the
set of 1574 chronologies. The average value of Grate is 0.0032, suggesting that
the very ﬂat proﬁle of the illustrative chronologies in Figure 4 is more broadly
representative. The standard deviation of Grate is 0.0136. The average value
of the real wage rate at the start of the historical chronologies is 14.43 real
10dollars8 with a standard deviation of 3.94. When the historical chronologies
are completed back to 1980 (where this is necessary), the average value of the
real wage in 1980 is 14.62 with a standard deviation of 4.7.9 The closeness
of the ﬁgures in rows 2 and 3 of Table 2 suggests that the historical and
completed chronologies are not very diﬀerent. This, despite the fact that
the completed average length of the chronologies over this window is 12.01
years. The number of renewals in the historical chronologies is, on average,
5.67 with a standard deviation of 3.93. Regarding industries and regions, 25
percent of all chronologies are from the manufacturing sector and 33 percent
of them are from Ontario.
A variable that has an important long-run role in the wage determination
process is aggregate productivity growth. The impact of aggregate produc-
tivity growth at the micro level is typically hard to discern empirically. The
variable ‘Prod’ is deﬁned at the sectoral level instead as the annual growth
rate of an index of labour productivity over the length of each historical
chronology. It was generated from Statistics Canada Table 383-0005 and
was attached to the HRDC database using the three-digit SIC code and the
eﬀective date of the contract. Prod has a mean of 0.0171 and a standard
deviation of 0.0183 over the chronologies in the sample - Table 2. In classical
8Note that this number is lower than the ﬁgure of 15.13 real dollars reported, in the
contract-based Table 1, as the average real wage at the expiry of the previous contract
because it is calculated at an earlier point in time.
9The fact that the 1980 average real wage of the completed chronologies exceeds the
average real wage at the start of chronologies (row, 3 versus row 2 in Table 2) suggests
that the real wage chronologies that have had to be projected back to 1980 entailed higher
than average real wages and/or lower Grates.
11terms, productivity growth at the sectoral level (unlike its aggregate coun-
terpart) should have no lasting eﬀect on the real wage rate in the sector.
We examine whether Prod is a signiﬁcant statistical force at the individual
chronology level.
Another variable that may condition real wage outcomes in the long run is
the professionalism and eﬀectiveness of the labour relations practices followed
by the bargaining pair.10 These practices are not exercised in a vacuum
but, rather, reﬂect the economic environment that the pair operates within.
A variable that may capture both aspects is the duration of negotiations
between the pair (Durneg) leading up to the contracts that make up the
chronologies. In the HRDC data, this variable is measured as the length of
time between the oﬃcial notice to bargain and the settlement date for the
contract. It has a mean of 8.18 months and a standard deviation of 4.37
months - Table 2. In a number of games, the pie gets smaller with delays
in reaching agreement. In this spirit, we take account of Durneg in the
empirical work below.
We also report, in rows 2 and 4 of Table 3, an alternative initial real wage
and the average value of the duration of negotiations in the previous contract
Pdurneg.These variables are used to deal with possible endogeneities in the
regression analysis that follows - see the next section. For the moment, we
note that, though they are independent of current-contract notions, they
10Blanchard and Philippon (2004) consider the links between the ‘quality of labor re-
lations’, the speed of learning by unions and the eﬀects on unemployment of economic
shocks. They provide an aggregative model that clariﬁes these links and some cross-
country empirical evidence that is consistent with their existence. For a political economy
treatment, see Aghion, Algan and Cahuc (2008). See also Park (2007).
12are close (in terms of descriptive statistics) to the variables that they will
instrument.
3M e t h o d o l o g y
Having introduced the concept of the wage chronology and having traced
out 1574 such chronologies in various industries and regions, we turn to an
econometric analysis of the determinants of the annual rate of real wage
growth, Grate, implied in each chronology. As already noted, this rate is es-
tablished for each chronology over its life. We control for industry and region
eﬀects but also explore the inﬂuence of the other variables mentioned above,
namely the average (over the chronology) annual rate of sectoral productivity
growth Prodand the average (over the chronology) duration of negotiations
embarked on by the pair Durneg.W h e n t h e i n ﬂuence of the initial real
wage is also taken into account, this wage is normalized at its 1980 value.
In the case of incomplete chronologies, Grate is used to project the earliest
available real wage backwards to 1980 and, in light of this, Grate remains
the appropriate regressand.
The forces of wage arbitrage and convergence would imply a negative
relation between Grate and the initial real wage lnW0. However, measure-
ment of this process could be complicated by unobservables. If, for example,
management quality is such that Grate deﬁned over the entire chronology
is (say) unusually low, this may imply low wages and an initial wage that
may also be unusually low. Thus, the initial wage when it is included as a
regressor may be positively correlated with the equation error term; if so,
13the estimator of the coeﬃcient on lnW0 will be biased. In order to avoid
this possibility, we instrument (using Two Stage Least Squares) the initial
1980 wage for each chronology using a relevant average of starting wages
which excludes the own wage for each particular chronology. This average
is calculated at the detailed three-digit industry level (rather than the more
aggregate level used in the regressions) and for the province (rather than the
more aggregate region used in the regressions) within which each particular
chronology is located - see row 4, Table 2. Its natural logarithm is used to
instrument the natural logarithm of the initial real wage lnW0.
A similar complication may arise with respect to Durneg. If, for instance,
large settlements that are due to unobservables take longer to negotiate, then
the error term may be positively related to Durneg, leading to bias in the
estimation of its coeﬃcient. The potential problem here may not be severe:
An unobservable that makes for a high wage settlement may not always in-
volve long negotiations if it is acknowledged by both sides of the bargain. In
addition, in the regressions that follow, Durneg is deﬁned as an average over
all the contracts signed by the pair in each chronology, thereby weakening
the endogeneity mechanism. Nevertheless, we explore two robustness checks:
First, we proxy the industrial relations context within which the bargaining
pair works with the previous-contract duration of negotiations (Pdurneg),
see row 8, Table 2 for descriptive statistics. In an alternative approach,
we treat Pdurneg as an instrument, in which case the predicted values for
Durneg and lnW0 in Two-Stage-Least Squares are constructed from all ex-
ogenous variables as well as the two instruments. These speciﬁcations are
explored in the appendix Table A1. All estimation is carried out with SAS.
14In order to generate the mean and variance of the real wage rate within
each chronology, it is necessary to conﬁne our attention to sequences that
entail more than one contract. Given that, we generate the sample mean
and standard deviation of the real wage rate prevailing at the start of the
contract (the end of the previous contract) using pexpwage.
In all cases, the average number of employees in each chronology is used
to weight the data for each chronology. For this reason we are unable to
comment explicitly on the ﬁrm size eﬀect.
4 Empirical Results
Table 3 contains estimates obtained. Results I-III refer to weighted OLS re-
gressions where the possible endogeneity of lnW0 is not taken into account.
Result I reports the regression of Grate on an intercept, Prod and Durneg
only. Prodhas the expected positive coeﬃcient and it is signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
e n tf r o mz e r oa tt h e1 %l e v e l . Durneg has a negative coeﬃcient which is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. When the logarithm of the
initial wage is added, in Result II, the estimates on the coeﬃcients of Prod
and Durneg are not substantially altered and the initial wage has a nega-
tive coeﬃcient which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. The
negative coeﬃcient suggests some degree of convergence in that chronolo-
gies with large values of their initial 1980 real wage tend to be associated
with low values of Grate. Industry eﬀects (Manufacturing is the omitted
class) and region eﬀects (Multi-province contracts are the omitted class) are
added in Result III. The coeﬃcients for these eﬀects are generally signiﬁ-
15cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. The estimated industry eﬀects are
consistent with the location of the proﬁl e si nF i g u r e2a n dt h er e s u l t si nG e r a
and Grenier (1994). This suggests that the stylized facts on inter-industry
diﬀerentials apply to base wage rates as well and, indeed (given that the
regressand is wage growth), the stylised facts may become stronger through
time. The estimated region eﬀects are consistent with generally held views
on regional income diﬀerences and growth patterns during this period; for
instance, realizing that comparisons are made indirectly through the omit-
ted class of multi-province chronologies, Ontario chronologies have relatively
high growth and those in the Atlantic provinces, Quebec and the Prairies
relatively low growth, suggesting that regional diﬀerences in base wage rates
may increase. We note, however, that the estimated industry and region ef-
fects (which are intercept shifts on Grate) are considerably smaller than the
coeﬃcient on lnW0.
The instrumental variable estimates appear in Results IV and V. Result
IV, which excludes the industry and region eﬀects, is quite similar to Result
II, the main diﬀerence being the reduced t v a l u ef o rt h ec o e ﬃcient on the in-
strumented initial wage, which nevertheless continues (at -10.56) to indicate
that the logarithm of the initial wage has a coeﬃcient which is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. Result V is analogous to Result III
and generally similar except that chronologies in the Atlantic, Quebec and
Prairie regions do not now have signiﬁcantly lower growth than chronologies
involving multi-region contracts. A Hausman (1978) speciﬁcation test ac-
cepts equality between the OLS and IV estimates and, indeed, the coeﬃcient
estimates in Results III and V are very close.
16Using the estimates in Result V, it is worth considering the quantitative
importance of the estimates for the explanatory variables Prod, Durneg and
lnW0.A n i n c r e a s e i n Prod by one standard deviation (0.0183 in Table 2)
would have the eﬀect of increasing Grate by 0.000926 (0.0506×0.0183). This
is approximately 29% of the mean value of Grate (0.0032) in Table 2. While
this is not an enormous eﬀect, it is not negligible. Thus, the average annual
productivity growth experienced over a chronology does have a measurable
eﬀect on the average annual growth rate of real wages over a chronology.
An increase in Durneg by one standard deviation (4.37 in Table 2) would
decrease Grate by 0.000874 (-0.0002×4.37), an eﬀe c tc o m p a r a b l et ot h a to f
an increase in Prodby one standard deviation. Thus, the ability of the pair
to work eﬀectively at the bargaining table does appear to have an impact
on the real wage fortunes of the pair. Finally, an increase in lnW0 by one
standard deviation (0.25 in Table 2) would decrease Grate by 0.00455 (-
0.0182×0.25). This suggests, relative to the productivity eﬀects, substantial
eﬀects through the convergence processes. The eﬀects of the convergence
calculations are about ﬁve times as large as those for productivity.
While the economic case for the endogeneity of Durneg is not overwhelm-
ing, it is important to examine whether the conclusions reached above are
robust to the procedures outlined in the previous section. In general, these
robustness checks are favourable and we, therefore, conﬁne their detailed
presentation to an appendix. Note that a Hausman (1978) speciﬁcation test
accepts the equality of the OLS and IV estimates. Table A1 reports details
of these checks. In the ﬁrst regression, the variable Durneg is replaced by
Pdurneg. The estimated coeﬃcient (-0.0004) is equal to that reported as
17Result I in Table 3. When the instrumented version of lnW0 is added to
Prodand Pdurneg, the estimated coeﬃcient (t value) is, at -0.0157 (-10.21)
very similar to Result IV in Table 3. This is also true when industry and
region eﬀects are included (columns 5 and 6, Table A1). In the alternative
robustness check, Pdurneg is also used as an instrument for lnW0 as well as
Durneg (columns 7 to 12, Table A1). In column 7, Table A1, the estimate for
the coeﬃcient on Durneg is higher and that for Prodl o w e rt h a ni nc o l u m n
1, Table A1. However, this diﬀerence disappears in the more complete spec-
iﬁcations: In the most complete speciﬁcation (columns 11 and 12, Table A1)
Durneg entails a coeﬃcient (-0.0002) which is identical to that in column 9,
Table 3, albeit with a t value which, at -1.97, indicates signiﬁcance at the 5%
but not the 1% level. The coeﬃcients on Prod and lnW0 continue to have
the expected signs and be signiﬁcant at the 5% level but they are somewhat
lower in absolute values relative to those in column 9, Table 3. Thus, the
calculations for their quantitative signiﬁcance discussed above may present
maximal impacts. Industry eﬀects in these regressions are not much aﬀected,
though the regional eﬀects display two noteworthy changes, namely the now
(relative to Result V, in Table 3) signiﬁcantly lower growth in real wages in
Quebec and British Columbia relative to multi-province chronologies.
The regressions of the mean value of the real wage on the variance of
each chronology are carried out as follows. In order to construct the mean
and variance within each chronology, at least two contracts are needed. We
have 1291 chronologies for which that is true. We have 1114, 955, 845, 738,
648, 540, 381, 282 and 224 chronologies for which we have 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10 and 11 contract renewals respectively. For each of these samples, we
18run the regression of the chronology mean on the chronology variance with
and without industry and regional eﬀects. The coeﬃcients (t statistics) on
the variance in these ten regressions are: 0.37 (5.46), 0.34 (4.8), 0.42 (6.06),
0.42 (5.94), 0.47 (6.45), 0.46 (6.00), 0.43 (5.50), 0.43 (3.74), 0.40 (2.98) and
0.08 (0.39) when the industry and region eﬀects are present. The results
when the industry and region eﬀects are omitted are very similar, with both
the estimated coeﬃcients and t statistics being somewhat higher. Note that,
when 10 contract renewals are present, the sample size is too small to support
any useful statistical analysis. Full results are available on request.
These estimates point to a positive association between the real wage
mean and the variance, suggesting a compensating diﬀerential (high real
wage risk employment requiring a higher average real wage).11 The size of
this diﬀerential seems substantial. The average level and the sample standard
deviation of the variance is 0.77 and 1.375, respectively, in the sample of 1291
chronologies with two contract renewals and these numbers grow to 1.111
and 1.919, respectively, in the sample of 282 chronologies with ten contract
renewals. The average real wage for these two samples is $15.02 and $15.75
respectively. An increase in the value of the explanatory variable by one
standard deviation in the sample of 1291 chronologies will increase the real
wage by $0.51 (1.375×0.37) on a real wage base of $15.02, or 3.4%. A similar
calculation for the sample of 282 chronologies will increase the real wage by
11Naturally, full indexation against the price level would smooth the real wage with
respect to inﬂation but not necessarily with respect to other shocks. Including an indicator
of how many contracts in the chronology have a cost of living allowance clause produces
coeﬃcients which are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent form zero on a consistent basis and do not
alter the estimates for the coeﬃcient on the variance of the real wage.
19$0.77 (1.919×0.40) on a real wage base of $15.75, or 4.8%.
The analysis in the previous paragraphs exploits the characteristics of
the contracts involved in these chronologies. Such information is not readily
available in other sources. We note that the history of other characteristics
(e.g. contract duration and indexation incidence and intensity) could also be
examined using the methodology involved in these chronologies. However,
such explorations are beyond the scope of the current paper.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we take a fresh look at the information contained in the
repeated wage agreements struck by bargaining pairs over more than two
decades with the view to examining, not the collective bargaining outcomes
at a point in time that have been studied so far, but the long run history of
the outcomes implied in these bargains. We focus on real wage chronologies
that trace out the history of the real wage for each pair in the sample. This is
an approach that has not been followed so far and one that, hopefully, casts
light on the long run behaviour of this all-important variable.
We generate the average annual growth rate in the real wage for each
chronology and study the inﬂuence of productivity growth, the speed with
which the bargaining pair can reach agreements and the initial wage on this
growth rate. We do so controlling for and estimating industry and region
eﬀects that are consistent with intensiﬁcation of the stylized facts on inter-
industry and regional wage patterns. We ﬁnd that productivity growth and
the bargaining skills of the pair inﬂuence the long-run growth in the real
20wage. Convergence in real wages, controlling for the other variables men-
tioned above, appears to be at work and it is quantitatively strong. An in-
verse relation between the mean and the variance in the real wage sequence
in a chronology is also present and it is quantitatively important.
The results in this paper pertain to the unionised sector, of course. While
l o n gr u na n a l y s i so ft h i sk i n di so n l yp o s s i b l eb e c a u s eo ft h en a t u r eo ft h e
information in this sample, the results obtained may illuminate behaviour in
the broader economy. The employees covered by this data represent 11% of
the Canadian labour force; to the extent that similar results hold for contracts
involving small numbers of employees, our ﬁndings would be more broadly
applicable. It is worth recalling that, in contrast to the US, union member-
ship in Canada as a proportion of non-agricultural employment is relatively
high (32% in 1999). As longer panels on individuals become available, it
would be interesting to focus on the long run labour market experience of
individuals, appropriately averaged over wide-enough groups to remove idio-
syncratic eﬀects. To our knowledge, these individual-based chronologies have
not been studied.
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Manufacturing Sector: NOBS = 387
Wage Growth = 2.169 (7.893) - 0.100 (-5.093)Initial WageTable 1
Summary Statistics Based on the Number of Contracts (NOBS 8928)
Variable Definition Mean St. Dev.
Pexpwage Nominal Wage at Expiry of Previous Contract 12.66 4.55
Expwage Nominal Wage at Expiry of Current Contract 13.69 4.57
Rpexpwage Real Wage at Expiry of Previous Contract 15.13 3.99
Rexpwage Real Wage at Expiry of Current Contract 15.24 4.00
Duration Length of the Contract (Months) 25.41 11.62
W dot Nominal Wage Adjustment (Annual %) 4.85 4.26
Nat. Res. Natural Resouce Sector 0.03 0.17
Manufact. Manufacturing Sector 0.20 0.40
Transport Transportation Sector 0.09 0.28
Commun. Communication Sector 0.04 0.19
Utilities Utility Sector 0.03 0.17
Trade Trade Sector 0.04 0.21
Education Education Sector 0.27 0.44
Health Health Sector 0.09 0.29
Service Service Sector 0.03 0.18
Others Other Sectors 0.18 0.38
Atlantic Atlantic Region 0.07 0.25
Quebec Quebec 0.16 0.36
Ontario Ontario 0.35 0.48
Prairies Prairie Region 0.17 0.38
BC British Columbia 0.12 0.32
Territories Territories 0.00 0.07
Multi Prov. Muti-province Contract 0.13 0.34Table 2
Summary Statistics Based on Real Wage Chronologies (NOBS 1574)
Variable Definition Mean St. Dev.
Grate Real Wage Growth Rate (Annual, Fraction) 0.0032 0.0136
W0 Real Wage at the Start of Chronologies 14.43 3.94
W0 - Projected Real Wage Projected to 1980 14.62 4.70
W0 - Instrument Real Wage Projected to 1980 - instrument 14.62 3.29
Length Length of Chronology (Years) 12.01 7.20
Count Number of Contract Renewals 5.67 3.93
Durneg Duration of Negotiations 8.18 4.37
Pdurneg Duration of Negotiations of Previous Contract 7.74 4.05
Nat. Res. Natural Resouce Sector 0.04 0.19
Manufact. Manufacturing Sector 0.25 0.43
Transport Transportation Sector 0.11 0.31
Commun. Communication Sector 0.04 0.20
Utilities Utility Sector 0.02 0.16
Trade Trade Sector 0.06 0.24
Education Education Sector 0.19 0.39
Health Health Sector 0.10 0.31
Service Service Sector 0.04 0.21
Others Other Sectors 0.14 0.34
Atlantic Atlantic Region 0.06 0.24
Quebec Quebec 0.19 0.39
Ontario Ontario 0.33 0.47
Prairies Prairie Region 0.14 0.35
BC British Columbia 0.12 0.32
Territories Territories 0.00 0.07
Multi Prov. Muti-province Contract 0.15 0.35
Prod Labour Productivity Growth 0.0171 0.0183Table 3
Weighted Regression of Long Run Chronology Real Wage Growth
Result
Variable coeff t stat coeff t stat coeff t stat coeff t stat coeff t stat
Intercept 0.0037 5.64 0.0492 24.11 0.0624 26.00 0.0442 11.4 0.0544 8.62
Prod 0.0626 3.53 0.0867 5.65 0.0530 3.21 0.0840 5.43 0.0506 3.04
Durneg -0.0004 -8.06 -0.0003 -5.97 -0.0002 -3.74 -0.0003 -6.15 -0.0002 -3.97
Ln W0 -0.0178 -23.21 -0.0212 -25.23 -0.0158 -10.56 -0.0182 -7.62
Nat. Res. 0.0036 2.08 0.0033 1.87
Transport. -0.0012 -1.13 -0.0013 -1.17
Commun. -0.0057 -4.91 -0.0055 -4.74
Utilities -0.0037 -2.33 -0.0038 -2.41
Trade -0.0052 -4.78 -0.0053 -4.82
Education -0.0034 -3.86 -0.0042 -3.93
Health -0.0045 -5.26 -0.0045 -5.26
Services -0.0076 -4.81 -0.0063 -3.44
Others -0.0083 -9.82 -0.0079 -8.86
Atlantic -0.0031 -2.50 -0.0023 -1.70
Quebec -0.0019 -2.37 -0.0016 -1.83
Ontario 0.0033 4.13 0.0034 4.20
Prairies -0.0020 -2.29 -0.0016 -1.61
BC 0.0005 0.54 0.0000 0.04
Territories 0.0091 1.99 0.0093 2.03
Adj. R Sq. 0.0503 0.2924 0.3926 0.1239 0.2166
V I II III IVTable A1
Weighted Regression of Long Run Chronology Real Wage Growth  (Endogenous Durneg)
Result
Variable coeff t stat coeff t stat coeff t stat coeff t stat coeff t stat coeff t stat
Intercept 0.0025 3.98 0.0442 10.73 0.0473 8.77 0.0052 5.23 0.0447 11.48 0.0471 9.21
Prod 0.0809 4.55 0.0748 4.84 0.0347 2.02 0.0565 3.13 0.0748 4.90 0.0347 2.03
Durneg -0.0004 -6.17 -0.0004 -7.04 -0.0003 -5.01 -0.0006 -6.20 -0.0003 -3.77 -0.0002 -1.97
Ln W0 -0.0157 -10.21 -0.0149 -7.65 -0.0159 -10.55 -0.0150 -7.81
Nat. Res. 0.0030 1.61 0.0030 1.62
Transport. -0.0014 -1.25 -0.0014 -1.26
Commun. -0.0058 -4.70 -0.0058 -4.73
Utilities -0.0033 -1.96 -0.0033 -1.97
Trade -0.0059 -5.20 -0.0059 -5.24
Education -0.0070 -7.49 -0.0070 -7.54
Health -0.0056 -6.68 -0.0056 -6.72
Services -0.0035 -2.06 -0.0035 -2.07
Others -0.0058 -6.71 -0.0058 -6.75
Atlantic -0.0021 -1.51 -0.0021 -1.52
Quebec -0.0024 -2.73 -0.0024 -2.74
Ontario 0.0019 2.21 0.0019 2.23
Prairies -0.0016 -1.62 -0.0016 -1.63
BC -0.0030 -3.43 -0.0030 -3.45
Territories 0.0075 1.58 0.0075 1.59
Adj. R Sq. 0.03431 0.10171 0.1962 0.0347 0.0104 0.1981
Pdurneg and Instrumented Wage Instrumented Durneg and Wage